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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I: METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

I ntentionality and World
The intentionality structure of an act of knowledge is the orientation of
a human knowing (noetic) subject towards a horizon of knowledge
constituted by a certain ordered context of objects given or to be given
in experience. The empirical answer to a particular noetic orientation
on the part of a human subject constitutes a noema.
The total ordered context of all actual or possible objects is called a
World. It is the "horizon of all horizons" 1. Kant took the notion of
World to be a regulative idea or principle 2. We do not accept this view.
Nor do we accept the view that the World is a derivative notion second
ary to the objects it contains and a mere
of these objects.
The World is prior to its elements; it gives reality to its elements. The
World may be considered rather as the broad field of human activity
which as far as the active and inquiring person is concerned is presup
posed by the activity of doing and questioning. It is part explored and
part mystery. But the part which is mystery is not totally hidden.
It is foreshadowed in outline as the full domain which human empirical
activity can attain.
The noetic intention is an attitude of inquiry, of questioning
attention to what is given in experience, accompanied by an active
search for what is already foreshadowed in some way by the question
even before any reply is obtained from the World. A noetic intention
then constitutes a reality-outline to be filled, and the filling of that
1

A. de Waelhens, La Philosophie et les expérience naturelles (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1961),

p. 110.
2 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, (London, Macmillan,
19 6 3), p. 392.
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outline does not occur all at once, but is a progressive process in which
there are always more questions at any stage than there are answers.
Hence, while noetic intentions are invariant elements in the structuring
of the World, the World is not a static ensemble of noemata given once
and for all, but it is an organically growing system which evolves and
develops according to the special intentionality-laws which rule it. The
intentionality structure of a particular question then prefigures the kind
of answer it will receive; not, however, that the question determines
that there should be an answer, but that an answer, if one should be
given, will appear not as totally disconnected with reality but as a
looked-for reality within an already ordered context which we called a
World, which is the horizon of the horizons of all empirically answer
able questions. As M. Dondeyne says:
is essentially
intentional; ... it presents the form of a dialectical relation between
a 'noesis' and a 'noema', the two calling to each other, and constituting
one another in an indissoluble unity ... If an intention is to be
actualised, it must be incarnated in a behaviour 'sui generis' called
'observation' ... ; for example, if a countryside seems to be dark and
sad, it is in part because I am sad discouraged; but it is also equally
true that sunless weather contributes to my sadness" 1,
A noema is an object of concrete factual knowledge. It is affirmed by
a knowing subject as
- not in isolation from the rest of reality 
but precisely because it partakes in the
of a total ordered context
of actual and possible realities which is hisWorld. True reality, then,
for a subject is his World. It constitutes the horizon in which single
isolated events have a place if and only if they are real.
It follows from this that there are many Worlds. Each epoch of
human history and each epoch of one's own personal history has its
World. Childhood, youth, maturity and old age have their Worlds,
different perhaps for different people. There is the World of the
physician, the World of the sportsman, the World of the
the
World of the wife. We shall be concerned with the World ofthe physical
scientist in the twentieth century.
Each of these Worlds represents some subject's sphere of reality; but
to see it as such, and to explore the richness of the reality revealed in
its perspective and illuminated by its light, one must be placed at the
noetic pole of such a World. The failure to do so leaves the World an
1

A. Dondeyne, Foi

1961), pp.

et

contemporaine, (Louvain, Publications Universit. ,
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incoherent jumble of pseudo-facts, distortions, and
1.
How often have we not heard humanists and philosophers mock at the
scientific culture of our day, while remaining profoundly ignorant, not
only of its depth, complexity and articulation, but also of the human
motivations of the scientists themselves. On the other hand, scientists
have on the whole little sympathy with a humanism which often
speaks pityingly of the agony of the human condition but with such
self-pity that no energy is left to better it. C. P. Snow has described
with a touch of bitterness this polarisation of our culture between two
great edifice of modern physics goes up", he
hostile Worlds:
wrote, "and the majority of the cleverest people in the modern world
have about as much insight into it, as their neolithic ancestors would
have had" 2. If, then, it is our aim to explore the reality structure of
modern physics, a necessary condition of this is that we learn to place
ourselves sympathetically at the noetic pole of perspective of a
working scientist. To fill this position, we have chosen one of the
creators of modern physics who, because of this, is also one of its most
authentic interpreters, namely, Werner Heisenberg. He will be our
guide to the World of quantum physics and the interpreter to us of
its reality.
A World is, at least in some way, given in and through experience.
Husserl defined it to be the "totality of objects that can be known
through experience, known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on
the basis of direct present experience" 3. The
in question were
for Husserl "given primordially in perception". It is our intention to
enlarge the notion of World to include the horizon of objects known
through the interpretation of data. Though not given "primordially in
perception" these interpretative objects, like atoms, electrons, etc.,
are none the less given through experience, and constitute an extension
of the notion real. They comprise a total ordered context of objects,
whose "reality" is based upon the interpretation of sensible signs
which reveal to the inquiring mind of the scientist the presence of these
objects in an experimental situation. The structure of this
World
of hidden objects revealed through sensible signs will be investigated
in the course of this dissertation.
1 "The properties of a physical theory are formulated in abstract mathematical language.
Let us compare them with a musical score. For those who cannot read notes, the musical
score is dead, but the man who understands them hears the melody in them". C. F. von
Weizsacker, The World View of Physics (London, Routledge and Regan Paul, 1962 ), p. 35.
2 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and a Second Look (Cambridge,
p. 15 .
3 E. Husserl, Ideas (London: 1931), pp. 51-2. Cf. also A. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 107-121,
Le Monde.
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A World is also intersubjective. It is a public arena in which many
people meet. People meet by orienting themselves mutually to one
another in a common World or in the ground common to their Worlds.
This overlapping of Worlds is a condition sine qua non of conlmuni
cation between people. The range over which they can communicate,
and the extent to which they can be in contact, is determined by how
much of a common World they share. A World, then, is essentially
a meeting place of a group – of young or old, of philosophers or
scientists. It is a condition of cooperative science. Moreover, since the
inquiring mind of man is never still but ceaselessly tries to unveil more
and more the potential riches of reality, the World itself is also af
fected by the scientific enterprise.
Objects and Objectivity
If the true home of real objects is a World, and if a World is consti
tuted by publicly accessible objects, how are these to be described? Is
there one kind of public object or are there many kinds? Does the kind
of object affect the meaning of "reality"?
In the first place, there are two kinds of public objectivity: one is the
public objectivity of the idea (or concept), and the other is the public
objectivity of a reality. The former is the property of whatever has an
exact and precise definition independently of particular places, times
and factual judgements. It belongs, not to any World, but to the realm
of ideas. The latter, however, makes its,appearance in a World of real
things, as the object of factual judgements, founded upon concrete
empirical experience; and hence its description contains an irreducible
element of the imprecise and indeterminate. Whatever can be precisely
and determinately defined by us is not as such a reality but an idea.
I n the second place, let us describe three classes of objects, and give
names to the in-itself correlate of each, viz., the correlate of each which
transcends consciousness.
The first is an object which is a unity, identity, whole and the stable
subject of properties, and which may be either an object given in
perception (viz., a phenomenal object) or a constructed object – like an
electron – which is linked by us to existence through sensible signs. The
transcendent being correlated with this object is called by us a thing 1.
This first class contains the following class as a sub-division.
The second class is that of phenomenal objects. This is the class of
objects "given primordially in perception". It might be described as a
1

We are using "transcendent" in the Kantian sense of "noumenal" or "in-itself".
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stable subject of perceptible properties in a spatially organised World.
In so far as this is represented in consciousness, we shall call it a
phenomenal object; in so far as it transcends consciousness we call it a
body in the strict sense. Allied to the notion of body as the transcendent
correlate of a phenomenal – and therefore perceptible – object, there
are two limiting concepts which we shall include under the name body.
They are: (I) what is conceived to have determinate spatial coordinates
at each instant – as, for example, a classical particle – even though it
is not perceptible (provided it is capable of yielding some sign of its
presence); and (2) a field as an infinitely extended medium for three
dimensional wave motions (provided also that it is capable of yielding
a sensible sign of its presence).
The kind of objectivity which is found here is one based
upon the
,
exteriority of subfect and object in perception, and we call it empirical
objectivity. This may be subdivided into phenomenal objectivity (for a
phenomenal object) and bodily objectivity (for a body). This kind of

object, however, is not so constituted by the act of knowing that it is
entirely separated from or independent of all subjectivity; for exteriority
implies its correlate, viz., the interiority of a subject, from which it
cannot be divorced. It is, then, always an object-for-me.
Is it possible for a knowing subject to know itself objectively? It is
evident that a contradiction would arise if we were to state that within
the relation of objectivity just described, the subject could become
object. However, there is a kind of
in which even the
subject as such can participate; that is an objectivity in which the
object is constituted as simply independent of a relation to a subject:
this we call formal objectivity. It belongs to whatever is affirmed as a
virtually unconditioned object on the basis of evidence. In physics, the
evidence is provided by a process of experimental verification. This kind
of object we call an object in the strict or formal sense, or sinlply a
object; for its intention is simply to express what is, independently of the
act whereby I know it as an object-for-me. The transcendent correlate
of an object in the strict of formal sense is, evidently, an individual
existing being, or a law of being.
Subjectivity

We define subjectivity to be the absence of the corresponding kind of
Objectivity. Subjectivity then is a word with many meanings which are
differentiated by the different types of objectivity defined and
distinguished above.

8
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Reality and its Criterion
Let us distinguish, moreover, the meaning of "reality" from the
criterion of reality. The first defines what is meant by the term; the
latter is that on account of which a thing is said by a certain knower to
be real: in our case, it is a sign through which its reality is manifested
to us.
It is clear that the word "reality" will have as many meanings as
there are different kinds of objects which can be conceived to constitute
a World. For example, if a World is conceived in the naively realist
sense to be an organisation of bodies in the strict sense, then "reality"
will mean "whatever can be perceived as a body". It is the charac
teristic empiricist understanding of the term, where meaning and
criterion are scarcely separated. If, taking a
sophisticated view,
the objects constituting the World are expressed by the limiting
concepts of classical particle and classical field, then "reality" will mean
"whatever has determinate spatial coordinates at every instant, or
whatever is an infinitely extended medium for three-dimensional wave
motions"; sensibility merely providing the presentative sign of their
presence. Interpreting the latter condition as merely a criterion of
reality, then the first part of the definition gives the characteristic
rationalist meaning of the term presupposed by classical physics.
Our own view is that an ontological World is constituted only by an
ordered context of objects in the formal sense, that is, of such objects as
are affirmed as virtually unconditioned obiects – i.e., as beings – on the
ground of evidence provided by a critical 's cientific process of testing
and verification.
We hold, moreover, that the criterion of physical reality for us is
extrinsic to its meaning, since we have no intellectual intuition of
physical reality. Our view then
physical reality can be summarised
in the two following points: (1) "reality" means "an object taken in
the strict or formal sense within the ordered context or horizon of such
objects which constitutes a World"; and (2) the criterion of reality for
us is a manifestation of its presence in the World through sensible signs.
This last is a rational criterion and not a purely sensible one, since the
recognition of the significance of the sensible sign is a rational and not
a purely sensitive act.
The World of Modern Physics
Among the many different Worlds, each defining reality for some
subject, one interests us in particular, viz., the World of twentieth-
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century physics. How is one to investigate the reality structure of the
World of modern physics? M. Dondeyne, I think, has given us the clue.
and
in science, he
Stressing the correlation between
writes:
the scientific object is to reveal itself to human con
sciousness with the structure which belongs to it, it must be approached
with a scientific attitude; it must be questioned scientifically; that is,
one must go out to meet it with hypotheses and verify these hy
potheses in the object; that is why science – even empirical or positive
science – is not the result of a purely passive attitude towards the
world, but it is (something to be done' in the strict sense of the term" 1.
If science is something the scientist does, then the method of
investigating the reality structure of modern physics is not to look out
there at things in the naively realist sense of the natürliche Einstellung
of Husserl in the hope of seeing electrons, protons, etc.,
to reflect
on the noetic intention of the scientist, to see what kind of objects he
was looking for, and by criticising this to arrive at a correct notion of
the ontological content of physics. The scientist has unveiled by his
experimental activity new but shadowy physical objects. Do they
belong to the scientist's World of reality in the same way as do the
tools and instruments of his research? Does scientific methodology
imply a certain meaning of "real"?? Is it necessary that scientists have
a comnlon meaning for "reality"? The pre-philosophic (or natural)
outlook of a physical scientist in post-classical physics is rarely that
of naive realism. Electrons, protons, etc., make
appearance in
the context of a World-out-there of bodies but
are never directly
given as bodies in this World. A cursory survey of current scientific
writings shows that two kinds of natural pre-philosophic outlooks
prevail among scientists to-day. There is the empiricist-positivist
outlook on the one hand which is content with practical results, with
what works. There is the rationalist outlook on the other hand which
assumes on the basis of the Newtonian tradition that only that which
has well defined space-time coordinates is a reality. Only careful
analysis of scientific method and a criticism of the pre-philosophic
conceptions of modern scientists will succeed in separating the true
noema which is the object in the forn1al sense of physics from the
intentionality-structure of the scientific method through which it is
revealed.
An investigation of this sort of the intentionality structure of
quantum mechanics is of interest not merely to philosophers but also
1

Dondeyne J loco

J

p. 26.
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to many physicists; for many to-day are deeply disquieted by the con
ceptual paradoxes which lie at the foundations of quantum physics. This
has led to a revival of interest in many of the old controversies and to
some new ideas, but largely to a resurrection of old ones which had been
forgotten. Professor Wigner sums up the situation thus: "The orthodox
view [viz., of Bohr, Heisenberg and the Copenhagen School] is very
specific in its epistemological implications. This makes it desirable to
scrutinise the orthodox view carefully and to look for loopholes which
would make it possible to avoid the conclusions to which the orthodox
view leads. A large group of physicists finds it difficult to accept these
conclusions and, even though this does not apply to the present
author, he adnlits that the far-reaching nature of the epistemological
conclusions makes one uneasy". Professor Wigner then adds the follow
ing suggestion: "The misgivings, which are surely shared by many
others who adhere to the orthodox view, stem from a suspicion that one
cannot arrive at valid epistemological conclusions without a careful
analysis of the process of the acquisition of knowledge" 1. The chapters
that follow are largely a commentary on this remark.

,

SECTION II: PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction
The period of crisis in physics which
to the construction of the
quantum theory was viewed at the time by those intimately connected
with it, not merely as a change in physics, but as a change in philo
sophic perspective about man, reality and human knowledge. Bohr,
impressed by the difference between our everyday vision of a solid
material world and the description given of it in quantum mechanics,
came to the conclusion that a physicist can no longer take an uncritical
attitude towards truth, reality and human knowing. All our expressions
as he wrote, "bear the stamp of our customary forms of perception
from the point of view of which the existence of the quantum of
action is an irrationality ... In consequence of this state of affairs, even
words like 'to be' and 'to know' lose their unambiguous meaning" 2.
Acknowledging the importance of clarifying at the start our basic
philosophical vocabulary, it is nevertheless with great reluctance that
1 E. P. Wigner, "The Problem of Measurement", Address to the American Physical
meeting at Washington, D.C., 1962; published in A
Jour. Phys., XXXI (1963), p. 6.
2 Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and the Description of
(Cambridge: 1961), p. 19.
"
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we propose to preface our discussion of the intentionality of quantum
mechanics with what might be called a set of implicit definitions of
terms. We do it with reluctance because such an attempt risks be
coming a pedantic monologue, in which a series of profound problems
are taken up in rapid succession and reduced to capsule formulae; for
if a set of definitions is to be a useful tool– and this is the purpose of our
introduction – it must incorporate in some way a definite viewpoint,
implying a certain problematic and a certain tentative solution. Our
excuse, then, is that such a sketch is necessary; and we wish to prefix
it with an apology for seeming to treat omnia scibilia in a few pages.

Being and Truth Truth
Being is what the content of any object taken in its ,strict or formal
sense expresses or tends to express, though whether truly falsely will
depend on the presence or absence of certain criteria. Truth is the
relation of conformity between the strict object of a judgement and the
being represented by it. We understand this relation to mean no more
and no less than what is found in the critical analysis of well-made
judgements. We assume, of course, that we know from experience
when we have made a well-made judgement. From an analysis of well
made judgements, we derive the conclusion that a true theory is one
which is asserted to be independent of all subjectivity (i.e. independent
of its being an object of knowledge) and posited in the absoluteness of
being. This we have called formal objectivity,
it is constituted by
an act of the mind which affirms that a sufficient set of conditions is
fulfilled to provide a rational ground for the affirmation of absoluteness
(or unconditionality).
The strictly real or ontologically real is the kind of being affirmed
or affirmable of bodies or things, and it is expressed by the content
of the strict object of true judgements in physics and in everyday life.
Restricting ourselves to the subject matter of physics, we can say that,
since we lack intellectual intuition of these, they are
to us
in knowledge as conditioned by the necessity of manifesting their
reality through some criterion. An object of knowledge, then, which
does not itself contain the criterion of its reality, may remain a mere
thought-object to be considered or supposed (whether as a pure idea
or as a phenomenal object). If, however, the criterion of reality is
given simultaneously with it, the object of knowledge may be asserted
as strictly or ontologically real.
The criterion for the reality of an individual factual object is that it
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should be given – either directly or indirectly – in perception, and
recognized rationally as such. The criterion for the truth of a physical
theory is contained in the elaborate process of scientific testing and
verification; and it is fulfilled only asymptotically with an ever
increasing probability. However, a distinction has to be made between
the criterion and the truth of a theory. The criterion is generally a
complex and unending set of tests, predictions and experiments which
comprise an open set of conditions linked asymptotically with the
truth of the theory. However, the set of conditions is not a linear chain
of conditioned conditions regressing indefinitely, but a set of true
factual judgements which individually and collectively provide the
evidence for the physical theory. It is part of the physicist's training
to know how to construct a set of strategic questions whose affirmative
answer would constitute a sufficient basis to justify the affirmation
of the theory as a virtually unconditioned object. By this we mean
that the theory is conditioned by certain criteria (viz., the evidence) but
that it is also virtually unconditioned because sufficient strategic
criteria – judged by experienced scientists to be such - are present to
justify this assertion. By the formula a true physical theory, we intend
no more than what has been just described.
Three kinds of cognitive activities which have their place in the
con1plete act of human knowing are of special interest for the work
that follows: first of all, acts of perception or sensible intuition;
secondly, acts of conceptual
and thirdly, acts of
affirmation or assertion. The object expressed by an act of the first
kind is a body taken in the strict sense; the object expressed by an
act of understanding is the content of a pure idea or concept; the
object expressed and constituted by an act of affirmation is an object
in the strict or formal sense. In the case of a factual judgement, this last
act falls on a content which is defined by a concept and whose reality
is indicated in perception.
Without going deeply into the genesis of these three kinds of acts
and their articulation within one complex act of knowing, we propose
to mention certain factors concerning them which are of great im
portance for the study we are about to make, and which are, in a sense,
the philosophical frame of reference of the author 1.
1 The elements of the philosophical analysis which foll ows have been strongly influenced
by Bernard Lonergen's work, Insight, A Study of Human Understanding (London: Long
mans, 1957), and the set of articles entitled "The Concept of the Verbum in the Writings
of 51. Thomas Aquinas" written by him and published in Theological Studies, VII (1946),

349-392;

VIII

(1947), 35-79, 4°4-444; x (1949), 3-40, 359-393.

. ,
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Concepts and Abstraction
The first is the nature of conceptual knowledge and of the act called
abstraction in which a concept is produced 1. A concept is an act of
knowledge answering the question: What is so and so? which, as
Lonergan says, is really a subtle way of asking: Of what are such and
such sensible data a manifestation? It expresses a nature, which is
not, however, an individual incommunicable nature, but a nature in
so far as this specifies and can be shared by an ensemble of individuals.
I t seems to be, then, on the one hand, the highest common factor of a set,
and for this reason it is said to abstract from all that is not common to
members of the set; as, for example, from particular places and times:
on the other hand, however, it is also the production or construction of
an ideal norm with respect to which individuals can henceforth be
compared as to the degree in which they conform to its rule or depart
from it; as, for example, when a circle is defined as the locus of points
equidistant from a fixed point called its centre. This last example also
brings out an essential aspect of the ideal norm – it
expresses a
relation between terms which are themselves mutually and implicitly
defined by the relations; for example, in the case of the circle, the
relation is one of distance equality between the centre and any point
on its circumference.
Thus there exist two classes of theories regarding the mental operation
of abstraction. We call the first the impoverishmen.t theory ot abstraction 2.
It assumes that we know individual cases first in their particularity and
then, by a kind of comparison akin to factorial analysis, we isolate the
highest common factor of the lot, and from this we form an impover
ished representation valid for a class of things. ·This assumes that the
content of the concept was actually known
to abstraction though
not as the common factor of a class of individual instances, and that
abstraction is a conscious act of comparing mental contents. Against
this theory, we object that no matter how many instances have been
considered, others remain unconsidered and among these there may be
some which would induce a modification of the content of the concept if
they were known. The impoverishment theory of abstraction serves the
useful purpose of helping to make empirical generalisations which are,

.. '

1 As we are not concerned with the different moments in the abstractive process, we are
taking abstraction globally to signify the whole process .
2 We have taken the name from a remark made by E. Cassirer: "As long as we believe
that all determinateness consists in constant 'marks' in things and their attributes, every
process of logical generalisation must indeed appear an impoverishment of the conceptual
content' '. Substance and Function (New York: Dover, 1953), p . 22.
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however, only preparatory organisations of data, and a way of
schematising experience in order to present this to the inquiring mind
under the form of regularities to be explained. The explanation is
achieved by the second form of abstraction.
The second theory is the enrichment theory of abstraction, and this
starts from contrary premises. It asserts that knowledge of particular
cases with which we start does not contain the concept, but that this
is the end-product of a complicated set of steps in which the analysis
of sensible data is of key importance. The preliminary steps are the
formulations of hypotheses, their testing and their acceptance or
rejection according to their value as abstract or ideal norms from which
the sensible data do not systematically diverge. During this process
certain data supposed to be irrelevant are left out; as, for example,
particular places and times, the exclusion, however; is not made on
the basis of a factorial analysis, but as a consequence of the kind of
hypothesis which is projected. The abstract norm is expressed as a
manifold way of being related to other things or to a knowing subject. The
ideal norm then does not suppress the particular cases or exclude them
from consideration in order to isolate a common "note", but it retains
them implicitly as sample terms in a relational structure which consti
tutes a systematic totality 1. This process then results in the positive
enrichment of the knowledge of particulars, (a) by the formulation of
sets of relations between them, and (b) by the definition of an ideal
norm or law, viz., a mathematical equation
function, from which
the sensible particulars do not systematically idiverge. We might call
this moment that of the formation of the pre-philosophic scientific
concept. The final moment is the formation or constitution of the
object in the strict or formal sense. This occurs when one takes cogni
zance of and reflects on the fact that the phenomenon so analysed is
only a symbol of a transcendent being 2. In this symbol the ideal re
lational norm corresponds to a formal similarity of essence; the un
systematic departure from the norm corresponds to an
open
ness to multiplicity; and the systematic totality in its fulness and
concreteness corresponds to the notion of World as an ordered context
of noemata.
The former theory of abstraction, viz., the impoverishment theory of
abstraction, has a long history, and traces of it are to be found in
1
2

Ernst Cassirer calls the systematic totality so related an Inbegrijj, ibid., p.
Cf., B. Lonergan, Theological Studies, x (1949), 3-40, especially p. 9.

22.
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Aristotle 1 and in most of the medieval philosophers, including
Aquinas 2. It is, however, especially characteristic of the philosophy of
Scotus 3, and of the strong tradition which, through Ockham and the
late medieval Nominalists, reached the modern era in two streams; the
empiricism of Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley, and the rationalism of
Descartes and Leibniz.
It is based upon the conception of the human mind as a mirror in
which is formed a passive reflection of what is out there in the external
world 4. Its notion of objectivity is limited to the kind that is founded
upon the relation of exteriority, and which we have called bodily
objectivity. Its view of concept-formation can be described as a process
of generalisation in which concepts are analysed, compared and
factorised. This exclusive view of concept-formation is – in one way
or another as we shall show later – characteristic of
and
philosophers of science of nearly every school with, however, some
notable exceptions; as, for example, Einstein, Hermann Weyl and
others. One important consequence of this theory is that, among
scientists of the classical rationalist tradition, reality in the concrete is
taken to be as specific and detailed as the content of the defining
concept; that is, if a scientific theory defines its concepts numerically
– as, for example, mass, position, etc. – then individual physical systems
are taken to have in reality, and independently of observation, precise
and determinate values of these up to an infinity of decimal places.
This is a view of the meaning of "reality" which
find among phi
losophers of a rationalist background and of physicists of the classical
school. Its insufficiency lies in its failure to advert to the fact that
numbers apply to sensible data which are merely symbols tor us of the
concrete reality which they manifest.
The enrichment theory of abstraction, of which there are suggestions
in Aristotle and Aquinas, has its advocates in modern times in the
philosophies, for example, of Ernst Cassirer and Hermann Weyl5. We
1 Ernst Cassirer claims to find in Aristotle a classic exposition of this theory of ab
straction (Substance and Function, pp. 4-9). However, such an opinion is not sufficiently
nuanced. Aristotle, after all, was the first to introduce a special faculty of the intellect to
account for the production of the intelligible form . It was through the development of this
clue that the enrichment theory of abstraction obtained its characteristic feature, viz., of
being constructive of intelligibility. Cf. also, ibid., pp. 18-26.
2 As, for example, in the Summa Theologica, I, p . 85, a.I.
3 Cf., B. Lonergan, Theological Studies, VII (1946), p . 372 .
4 For Scotus, sensibility was only the occasion of the formation of the men tal image; for
Aristotle, sensibility was instrumental in its formation .
S Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, loc.cit.; Hermann Weyl, PhilosoPhy of Mathe
matics and the Natural Sciences (Princeton: 1949) .
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differ from the last two in seeing two moments in the process of object
formation. The two moments are: (a) that in which the sensible data are
synthesised and the first (scientific or pre-philosophic) enrichment
occurs and (b) that in which the second and final (or ontological)
enrichment occurs and the strict object of knowledge is formally
constituted.
Human knowledge in the course of its developnlent uses (a) as a
moment to reach (b); but finding
difficult and laborious – as
e.g., in scientific research – while its completion and fulfilment in (b)
is accomplished naturally and easily, the existence of two moments in
the full act of knowledge can easily be overlooked. Moreover, as the
difficulty of scientific research lies in (a), it would be possible for us to
agree with scientists and philosophers of science in their account of (a)
without thereby accepting fully their views of knowledge and reality.
Thus Ernst Cassirer and Hermann Weyl share the view that the
enrichment of sensible data occurring at the stage of the synthesis of
sensible data consists in the formation of an ideal relational norm from
which individual data do not systematically diverge 1. However, their
view of the meaning and criterion of reality and of the relation between
sensibility and intellect is different from ours. In the enrichment
theory of abstraction, the pre-philosophic scientific concept is not an
apodictic norm as a Scotist norm must logically be, but merely a possible
norm which is verified in the data up to a certain degree of accuracy in fact.
Since it is an ideal norm, individual cases
expected to diverge from
it, but not in a way that can be defined. Moreover, individual cases are
known to be random samples of the ideal norm. And finally, it expresses
something absolute only in so far as this is a subject or a term of a set
of relations within a systematic totality; this implies the ontological
position that we know no physical thing in its absolute nature except
in so far as this is a part of a World.
Deterministic (Causal) Theories 2
The preceding analysis reveals the possibility of two kinds of physical
theories: deterministic or causal theories and probabilistic theories.
1 Cassirer, loco cit., and
loco cit. We differ from both these authors in stressing that
the ideal relational norm is derived from sense data and expresses the intelligibility present
in these data, without being itself a sense datum. In our view, the sense data, when under
stood, is understood to be a symbol whose inner function and purpose is to manifest being;
i.e., not merely the phenomenal being of the symbol, but the transcendent being to which
it points. The metaphysical position of both Cassirer and Weyl is that of Neo-Kantian
Idealism.
2 In keeping with common usage among physicists, deterministic is here taken as synony
mous with causal.
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The first kind is represented by the construction of an ideal relational
norm for sensible data from which individual cases do not system
atically diverge 1. Consider, for example, Newtonian Mechanics. A
particle is defined as the subject of six independant phase-space
variables, viz., position and momentum in each of three directions; all
six are relative to a frame of reference and to a unit. The laws of
mechanics define by implicit definition how these are related through
their time derivatives and through force (also relative concepts) with
one another 2. All variables are described operationally through ap
propriate measuring processes which map them onto the number
field 3. The equations are such that, given the initial values of all
phase-space variables and the form of the law of force, the state of an
isolated system at any future (or past) time epoch can
calculated
exactly. This kind of theory is called a deterministic or causal theory 4,
since it allows the calculation of the future or past state of an isolated
system if its state is given at an arbitrary origin of time. The isolated
system in question, however, is not a
system, for all its variables –
even position – are supposed to be defined with an infinite degree of
precision, while data on any real system are obtainable only up to a
certain degree of accuracy 5. Hence the system described by Newton's
Laws is one which is represented (or symbolized) by an idealised
conceptual model; in other words it is an ideal or abstract norm.
A deterministic theory serves two functions: (1) it connotes a self
defining set of physical relations, and (2) it yields a set of mathem
atical functions, parametrised by the time, which describe how a set
of ideal measure numbers changes with the time parameter. It does not
directly describe an individual physical system but it compares this
with a constructed norm, viz., with a set of precise mathematical
functions of which it is to be regarded as a random sample of one.
This process may also be called idealisation; it is the product of enriching abstraction.
This is sometimes called a constitutive definition. For the nature of
definition,
cf., D. Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie (Leipzig: 1930); Weyl, loc. cit., chap. I; and infra,
chap. IV.
3 The relation between the implicit (explanatory) definition and the operational de
scription is discussed below in chap. IV.
4 A deterministic of causal physical system sometimes denotes simply a classical particle
or a classical field, for it is supposed that such a system is always governed by deterministic
laws, even when the behaviour of the system at every instant is not fully known, as, e.g.,
in a classical thermodynamical ensemble.
5 Cf. M. Born, "The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics", Science, c x XII
(1955), 675-679; M. Born and D. ]. Hooton, Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc., V (1956), 52, 281. Born
and Hooton show of what little significance in fact is the knowledge of precise initial
conditions even for a classical system.
1

2
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Probabilistic Theories 1
A random case is one which is selected from a range of possibilities
and belongs to a random set. A random set is a collective with the
following properties: (I) it is a finite sample of elements, which are
individual, concrete and independent instances of the same ideal norm;
(2) and such that there exists a unique function which expresses the
ideal relative frequency of occurrence of each of the possibilities. By ideal
in the second context we mean that the relative frequencies of any
finite sample of sufficiently large size is not significantly different from
the ideal relative frequency. This property is also called the ergodic
hypothesis.
This definition has the advantage that it incorporates the essential
features of von Mises's classic definition without being open to the
attacks arising from the infinite collectives in his explanation and the
type of limiting processes he envisaged 2. First of all, since only the
relative frequencies are counted in any set, the order in which the
elements arise or are considered is immaterial to the calculation. This
satisfies von Mises's condition of irregularity. Secondly, his limiting
frequencies in an infinite collective are no more than ideal relative
frequencies in the sense we have just defined 'a nd can be understood and
postulated independently of the limiting procedure which he described.
They do not then belong to any concrete finite or infinite collective,
but to an ideally constructed norm for all random sets of a given type.
Finally, von
condition of
satisfies our definition and
is perhaps the most reasonable translation of it into mathematical
language – i.e., if it should be proved to be consistent with itself.
The present author's intention is not to propose a new basis for the
calculus of probabilities but rather to bring out one essential epistemo
logical aspect of the classic concept of probability, namely, that the
classic concept is itself an ideal abstract norn1 and not a concrete value
belonging to any actualisable collective. Hence, as von Mises himself
was aware, the postulation and subsequent testing of statistical
hypotheses involves the same set of epistemological problems as the
construction and testing of deterministic hypotheses 3.
1 The exposition of the following paragraphs owes much to chap. IV of Insight by B.
Lonergan, and to Probability and Induction (Oxford : 1949), by W. Kneale.
2 R. von Mises, Probability, Statistics and Truth (New York: 1939). Cf., W. Kneale,
Probability and Induction, pp. 150-167.
3 "The relation of the theory of infinite collectivities and observation is ... essentially
the same as in all other physical sciences", R. von Mises, loc. cit., p. 125, quoted by
Kneale, loco cit., p . 160.
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Our definition, however, adds a new element of importance for it
states what constitutes a member of a random set. It is whatever is
judged to be a concrete and independent instance of the same ideal
norm among a set of such independent instances. The ideal norm con
notes the choice of a type of theory and of a set of initial conditions.
The similarity of initial conditions is to be judged according to the
practical criteria of significance employed by experienced physicists.
Similar instances of the same ideal norm are not the same as equi
probable instances, since there is no reason why the distribution of
instances in a random set need be governed by a constant probability
measure. Random instances do not, however, differ significantly and
systematically. Individual concrete cases which are similar instances
of the same ideal norm of this sort constitute a random set.
Our definition, moreover, has the added advantage of explaining
how random sets occur in experience and how they are related to our
way of knowing. They occur as sets of individual instances which in
experience exhibit a margin of "uncertainty" or "error". This un
certainty is the same as the deviations from the mean which Laplace
took to be the subject matter of probability. We ascribe them to a
different cause 1. The results of a set of experiments, judged by
practical criteria to be performed under similar conditions, are generally
distributed on a range of values and the relative frequencies of oc
currence of the different values in the set tend in general to a limit. This
limiting frequency is a new ideal norm, however it conceived. In the
classic definition it is conceived to be the limiting relative frequency
within an infinite series of individual instances. In any event, whether
it be defined in this way or as we suggest, it describes not the actual
results of any test but a new abstract concept which is called by the
physicist the probability of occurrence 2.
According to the view which we have expressed, probability laws
arise out of the very nature of scientific knowing and are an essential
complement of deterministic (or causal) theories. They depend on the
latter for the definition of the variables, of the initial conditions and
of the law of development or evolution of the physical system. They
1

As R. L. Ellis writes: "Mere ignorance is no ground for any inference whatsoever:

ex nihilo nihil", Mathematical and Other Writings, ed. G. Walton (Cambridge: 1863), quoted
by W. Kneale, loc. cit., p. 151.
2 A probability or a probability measure is generally predicated of a particular value or of
a particular interval in the range respectively; the distribution of frequencies in an ensemble
based upon a set of probabilities is called a statistical distribution. An individual case con
sidered as a sample of one taken from a statistical distribution is often called a virtual

ensemble.
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complement deterministic laws because they succeed in organising
material which a deterministic law omits as irrelevant to its type of
synthesis, namely, the distribution of variations of concrete measured
data from the ideal mathematical law 1.
We shall have occasion later on to return in more detail to the
points outlined above for the epistemological analysis of probability
is one of the central problems for the interpretation of quantum
mechanics 2 .
Probability and Human Ignorance
Our epistemological position can be clarified by comparing it with
the common – and classic – view that probability laws in physics are
based upon human ignorance of aspects of the concrete situation due
to such factors as, for example, the complexity of the situation or to
the crudeness of measuring instruments. This was the view of Bernoulli,
Laplace and Leibniz, and its classical exposition is found in Laplace's
work, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities 3. It is the view most
commonly held by physicists and philosophers of science to-day.
Let us distinguish two types of ignorance. The first type belongs
to the man who sees a series of near-similar events happening but does
not know enough about them individually to be able to deduce the law
in the series. The second belongs to the man who knows that there is
no determinate law in the series, viz., that the series is merely factual
and nothing more. We hold that
laws are founded upon
the latter state of mind and that it is not really a kind of ignorance but
a kind of negative knowledge. Because of this negative judgement, he
can limit the possibly significant material of any series to relative
frequencies of occurrence within the series, that is to probabilities.
It can be objected that if, like Laplace's demon, we had exact
knowledge of the initial conditions of a physical process, we should
then be able to predict the behaviour of the system and the need for
merely probabilistic laws would vanish. This objection is based upon
an ontology and an epistemology different from that defended by the
present author. One source of this objection is the rationalist Principle
of Sufficient Reason as, for example, understood by Laplace and
Leibniz, which is intimately connected with the rationalist view of
reality. Another source of this objection is a view of knowledge very
Cf., Lonergan, Insight, chap. IV, pp. 46-51.
Infra, chap. II, section VII, pp. 38-41.
3 Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (New York:
1951), chap. II; and also W . Kneale, loco cit., pp. 1-21.
1

2
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like the Scotist one, according to which individual cases are thought
to be known in individual concepts from which common notes are
abstracted by conceptual analysis. If this were so, then each system
would have to have the same infinite precision as their factorised
norm.
On the contrary, we hold that our initial knowledge of particular
cases is defective and potential. This is eventually enriched by ab
straction with the construction of an ideal, abstract or limiting case
which has the property that particular cases do not diverge system
atically from it or that particular cases can tend to it but never reach it.
The non-systematic element which enters into our knowledge of indi
vidual cases will be discussed more fully below and is connected with
the essential function of sensibility in the acquisition of
and
in the formulation (or constitution) of the strict object in which alone
physical reality is truly known by us 1.
It may be conceded to the objection that since we have no intel
lectual intuition of physical reality, there is always more in any
particular case than we can ever know. However, this lack of knowledge
is not simply a question of decimal places. The particularity of a
physical reality does not consist in the supposed possession of an
infinity of exact decimal places. It would be mistaken to assume that
we approach asymptotically the individuality of a particular case by
accumulating more and more of these. There is a limit, as every
physicist knows, to the significance of any
series. The reason
for this is that decimal places and number-mapping in general belong
to the human manipulation of the sensible symbols through which
reality is known by us. They are instruments useful to an abstractive
mind like man's, but not to a non-abstractive intelligence which would
know the concrete case in its particularity and within the context of
a concrete pattern of relations. Not having sensibility, the non
abstractive intelligence would have no need to map these relations on
a number field as we are accustomed to do.
For this reason we think it misleading to say that probability laws
arise out of human ignorance. In one sense probabilities indicate an
absence of comprehensive knowledge, viz., the intellectual intuition
of concrete physical reality. In a more important sense, however, they
are founded not upon ignorance but upon the abstractive character
of human scientific knowing and represent an irreducible factor of
scientific knowing. The contrary view which we oppose is connected
1

Infra, chap.

II,

pp. 30-32 and chap. v, pp. 107-9.
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moreover with an ontology and epistemology which we find impossible
to justify 1.
Probability of Evidence
There is another sense of probability which should be carefully
distinguished from the former sense: it has been variously called
"acceptability", "credibility", "reasonableness" etc. 2. It is not a
concept but a quality or mode of the affirmation of the judgement.
It is the estimate of the connection between the evidence for a judgement
or a theory made on the basis of the process of a scientific verification,
and the necessary ground that the judgement or theory could be
rationally affirmed in a virtually unconditioned judgement. A virtually
unconditioned judgement – which is a certain
- is one for
which sufficient conditions for a reasonable affirmation are known to
be fulfilled in fact. If, however, the inquiry has not been pursued to a
definitive conclusion, then a probable judgement can be made on the
basis of insufficient evidence, where the probability in question is not
measured in terms of ideal frequencies but in terms of how far or how
near it is to the status of being virtually unconditioned. Judgements
about probabilities in the first sense (viz., as ideal frequencies) can be
either certain judgements or, if the evidence is not complete, merely
probable judgements, where certain and probable here refer to the
particular sense of probability discussed in this paragraph.
Summary
The method, aim and presuppositions of the present work are
outlined in this chapter. The subject matter of the book is the quantum
mechanics of Heisenberg. Its aim is to state and analyse the problem
atic called the "crisis of objectivity" or the "crisis of reality" in
quantum physics. Its method is an analysis of the intentionality
structure of quantum physics as Heisenberg conceived it to be and,
through a critique of this, to arrive at a clarification of the problem
and of its presuppositions, and eventually at a tentative solution.
Section I deals with the method and aim of the dissertation; Section II
defines some of the philosophical vocabulary used in the text.
1 Cf. O. Costa de Beauregard, Le second principe de la science du temps (Paris, Seuil, 1963),
PP·47-49·
2 "Acceptability" is used by W. Kneale, loco cit. ; "reasonableness" is used by R. Braith
waite in Scientific Explanation (Cambridge : 1953); B. Russell uses "credibility" in Human
Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits (London: 1948); Karl Popper uses "verisimilitude" in
Logic of S cientific Discovery (London : 1959); R. Carnap's "degree of confirmation" serves
th e same purpose.

